المحكمة  العليا

القضاة :

سعادة السيد / مصطفى محمد بشار          قاضي المحكمة العليا        رئيساً

سعادة السيد / حسين عوض أبو القاسم      قاضي المحكمة العليا          عضواً

سعادة السيد / جون وول ماكيج             قاضي المحكمة العليا          عضواً

سعادة السيد / هاشم حمزة عبد المجيد       قاضي المحكمة العليا        عضواً

سعادة السيد / حيدر مصطفى حمد            قاضي المحكمة العليا        عضواً

الأطراف :

عبد العزيز علي محمد خير          طاعـن

// ضد //

محمد عوض الكريم محمد           مطعون ضده

النمرة : م ع/ط م/483/1996م

مراجعة / 226/1996م

المبادئ:

قانون المعاملات المدنية لسنة 1984م  -  من القواعد الأساسية لإصدار الأحكام " رد الحقوق إلي أهلها ودفع المظالم " المادة 6(أ) معاملات

قانون المعاملات المدنية لسنة 1984م  -  حق القواعد الأساسية لتطبيق القانون " الضرر يدفع بقدر الإمكان " المادة 5(أ) معاملات

موافقة الأسرة ليشت شرطاً لازماً لصحة تصرف الزوج بالتنازل لأرض مسجلة باسمه عن طريق الحكر

 

رأي مخالف :

تتوقف ضرورة الحصول على موافقة الأسرة على تصرف الزوج بالتنازل على أرض مسجلة باسمه عن طريق الحكر تتوقف على وجود شرط الحكر المبرم بينه وبين الحكومة ينص على ضرورة الحصول على موافقة الأسرة فإن وجد هذا الشرط فأي تصرف مخالف لذلك يجعل عقد التنازل باطلا

قانون المعاملات المدنية لسنة 1984م  -  حق القواعد الأساسية لتطبيق القانون " الضرر يدفع بقدر الإمكان " المادة 5(أ) معاملات

المحامون :

1 -  الأستاذ /  علي أحمد السيد                             عن الطاعن

2 -  الأستاذ /  معتصم السيد عثمان                   عن المطعون ضده

الحكـــم

القاضي :  حسين عوض أبو القاسم

التاريـخ : 4/1/1997م

    أمام محكمة الخرطوم الجزئية صرحت الدعوي المدنية 913/1992م  بتاريخ 14/3/1992م ( تاريخ دفع الرسوم ) في مواجهة المدعي عليه للمطـالبة بإبطال بيع العقار 23مربع 6 جبره حيث أن المدعي عليه قد تنازل عن منفعة هذه القطعة للمدعي نظير مبلغ 900 جنيه وفشل المدعي عليه في الحصول علي موافقة الزوجة آمنه محمد أبوزيد وهي التي منحت بموجبها القطعة لكفالتها وأولادها ووقعت علي التنازل زوجته الثانية سعديه محمد إبراهيم ولم تكن موافقتها هي المطلوبة ويطالب بتعويض قدره 2 مليون جنيه زائداً الرسوم وأتعاب المحاماة الاتفاقية وقدره 50 الف جنيه - وفي تاريخ لاحق عدلت الدعوي لتقتصر علي المطالبة بإثبات البيع وتعديل سجل القطعة باسم المدعي بالاضافة إلي الرسوم وأتعاب المحاماة الاتفاقية وإحتياطياً المطالبة بتعويض قدره 2 مليون جنيه بعد تحديد نقاط النزاع والإقرارات أصدرت محكمة الموضوع بتاريخ 25/4/1993 م حكمــاً إبتدائيـــاً بتغيير سجل القطعـــة 23مربع 6 جبره من اسم المدعي عليه محمد عوض الكريم لاسم المدعي عبد العزيز علي محمد خير ويكتب بذلك لسلطات الأراضي للموافقة أو الرفض وبتحميل المدعي عليها للرسوم والأتعاب وبتاريـــخ 5/2/1994م أحضر محامي الدفاع موافقة سلطات الأراضي علي تغيير سجل القطعة

    محكمة إستئناف ولاية الخرطوم وبقرارها م أ / أ س م/ 816/93 بتاريخ 21/3/1994 م عندما استئونف لها الحكم الإبتدائي قررت شطب الإستئناف إيجازياً برسومه

  طعن كذلك في الحكم الإبتدائي والإستئنافي للمحكمة العليا والذي جـاء قـرارها م ع/ ط م / 559/1994 م بتاريخ 30/3/1995م بشطب الطعن إيجازياً علي أساس أن موافقة الزوجة ليست ضرورية لنفاذ التصرف طالما كان العقار مسجلاً باسم الزوج وأن الحكم يصبح معلقاً علي شرط موافقة السلطات المختصة

كانت سلطات الأراضي قد وافقت علي تغيير السجل بتاريخ 6/5/1993م وفي مرحلة سابقة أحضر خطاب من الأراضي بتاريخ 6/6/1995م مفاده أن القطعة موضوع الدعوي خاضعة لتحقيق إداري ومحجوزة وبالتالي يعتبر الخطاب السابق ملغي والقطعة محجوزة بوساطة مدير الأراضي ويبين الخطاب موافقة مدير الأراضي علي البيع

  وبتاريخ 1/11/1995 م صدر حكم نهائي بتغيير سجل القطعة كما جاء بالحكم الإبتدائي

   محكمة إستئناف ولاية الخرطوم بقرارها م أ/أ س م / 1967/95 بتاريخ8/7/1996م ألغت حكم محكمة أول درجة وأصدرت حكماً جديداً يقضي بأن يدفع المدعي عليه للمدعي مبلغ 2 مليون جنيه علي سبيل التعويض أن يتحمل المدعي عليه رسوم الدعوي وأتعاب المحاماة ورسوم الإستئناف

  أيدت المحكمة العليا حكم محكمة الإستئناف بقرارها ط م / 483/1996م بتاريخ 30/9/1996واستندت المحكمة العليا إلي أن الموافقة الأولي لمدير الأراضي كانت خاطئة بحسبان أن الزوجة التي تستحق الموافقة أو الرفض للبيع هي الزوجة الأولي وليست الزوجة الثانية التي وقعت علي التنازل

  أمام هذه المحكمة تقدم الأستاذ علي أحمد السيد المحامي بطلب لمراجعة قرار المحكمة العليا علي أساس أن سلطات الأراضي لا تملك حق الرجوع علي الموافقة مرة أخري وهذا يشكل ضرراً لطالب المراجعة مخالفاً لأحكام الشريعة الاسـلامية وفق المادة 5 فقرة (أ) والمادة 6 فقرة(أ) من قانون المعاملات المدنية لسنة 1984م وإن ما قامت به سلطات الأراضي يجعلها مسئولة عن الضرر الذي أصاب الطاعن وفقاً للمادة 160/1 من قانون المعاملات المدنية وهو يعتبر استهتاراً بواجباتها وإهمال غير مبرر وبقرار المحكمة العليا يكون المطعون ضده ثري بلا سبب مشروع وهذا حرام شرعاً والثراء الحرام مخالفة لأحكام الشريعة الاسلامية وأن المراجع له أخفي زوجته الأولي عن عمد ليأتي بها لتعلق عدم موافقتها علي البيع تم تصريح الطلب ورد علي أسبابه محامي الطرف الآخر الاستاذ معتصم السيد عثمان ويقول ينبغي شطب الطلب بموجب المادة 215 من قانون الإجراءات المدنية حيث فشل طالب المراجعة في إثبات مخالفة الحكم لأحكام الشريعة الاسلامية وأن موافقة مدير الأراضي الأولي كانت موافقة مبدئية وأن الرفض الآخر قد تم تسبيبه ويلتمس في النهاية شطب طلب المراجعة

  لا جدال حول الوقائع فهي متفق عليها في شتي مراحل التقاضي الوارد ذكرها أعلاه  لكن السؤال الذي يثور هو هل يحق لسلطات الأراضي بعد أن أبدت موافقتها علي تغيير السجل الرجوع عن تلك الموافقة ؟

  إننا علي قناعة تامة بأن الموافقة الأولي والتي صدرت بعد قرار صدور الحكم الإبتدائي وقبل أن يصبح الحكم نهائياً هي الواجبة الإتباع ولا يحق لسلطات الأراضي الرجوع مرة أخري عن تلك الموافقة إذ كان عليها التحري والتمحيص والتدقيق قبل أن تمنح تلك الموافقة لأن الأمر ليس عملية ميكانيكية الغرض منها ترتيب الملف بتوقيع مسئول الأراضي وأن يصدر قراره بمجرد تقديم الطلب  الدراسة التي قام بها وسبب بها قرار الرفض لاحقاً كان المفروض أن تتم في الموافقة الأولي وبهذه الطريقة الرفض أو الموافقة اللاحقة أو العكس يخلق نوعاً من البلبلة وعدم الإستقرار في المعاملات والأحكام فهي رأس الأحكام تكون تارة عرضه للحكم بالنقض العيني واخري لاحقاً هذا التنفيذ العيني لمجرد رجوع مصلحة الأراضي عن قرارها  إن الأسباب التي إنبني عليها القرار الأخـير ليست ضرورية لنفاذ التصرف وهذا ما جاء بحكم المحكمة العليا الأول بعد أن تأيد الحكم الإبتدائي في ط م 559/1994م  بتاريخ 30/3/1995م إن قرار المحكمة العليا الأخير والمؤيد لقرار محكمة الإستئناف يسبب أضراراً بالغة بالنسبة لطالب المراجعة إذا ما تم تنفيذه ذلك أن موافقة الأسرة ليست شرطاً لازماً لنفاذ العقد طالما أن الأرض مسجلة باسم المتصرف وهذا ما هو ثابت بالمحضر ومن ثم فإن الضرر واحد من المباديء التي تنادي الشريعة الاسلامية بتلافيه وعدم الوقوع فيه لأنه يعد إنتهاكاً لحقوق العباد وتأسيساً علي ما تقدم نري قبول طلب المراجعة شكلاً وفي موضوعه نقرر الغاء حكم المحكمة العليا محل المراجعة بالرقم ط م/483/1996م والغاء حكم محكمة إستئناف ولاية الخرطوم بالرقم أ س م / 193/1995م وتأييد قرار محكمة أول درجة الصادر بتاريخ 1/11/1995م ولا أمر بشأن الرسوم

القاضي :  مصطفي محمد بشار

التاريـخ :   30/3/1997م

أوافق

القاضي :  هاشم حمزه عبد المجيد

التاريـخ : 2 / 4 / 1997م

أوافق

القاضي :  حيدر مصطفي حمد

التاريـخ : 5/4/1997م

أوافق

القاضي :  جون وول ماكيج

التاريـخ : 14/4/1997م

       The applicant/plaintiff, Abdel Aziz is requesting this panel to review the decision of the Supreme Court (SC/CO/483/96) with respect to plot No 23 Q6 in Jabra Khartoum area The facts of this case are clear in the decision of the Supreme Court and need no reproduction here But it suffices to state that the respondent/defendant Mohamed Awad is the registered owner of that land he , agreed to sell it to the applicant and that , Mohamed Awad , the seller was, under this agreement obliged to cause the alteration of registration from his name to that of the applicant or the buyer It had been stipulated in the lease between the Government and the respondent (seller) that any disposal of the land was to be approved or consented to by the respondent's first wife and Government When the district Judge for the first time requested the consent of land authorities, such consent or approval was conditionally granted that is, depending on the first wifes consent But the land authorities subsequently revoked their conditional approval when they discovered that the consent given for the sale of the disputed land was that of the second wife and not that of the first wife, which is provided in the leasehold The lease is the contract between the government and Mohamed Awad ( the Seller)

      My learned colleagues hold that the consent of the members of the proprietor's family is immaterial where he intends to dispose of the land registered in his name It is true, many cases have been decided in that respect before by the supreme court

      But those cases had in mind by my learned colleagues must be distinguished from the one before usIn each of those cases, the lease which is a statutory contract between the Government ( or land authorities ) and the individual citizen did not contain any restrictive term or terms with regard to the disposal of the land concerned by the said individual citizen But in the case before us, the government in the execution of the housing policy, inserted a restrictive condition in protection of the family against the disposal of the said land by the head of the family Mohamed Awad without their consent The lease provides that Mohamed Awad cannot dispose of the disputed land unless a written consent has been given by the government In other words, the validity of any contract of sale or disposal between Mohamed Awad and a third party must be in breach of the lease and is therefore null and void unles it has been consented of by the government

      At this juncture reference will be had to the law on point A Judicial authority on the point is the case of Hassan Taha Naser and Khodra Hussein Mohd, Nasr V Salima Jaber (1987) SLJR 248

     The facts in that case were precisely this: Hassan Taha was the registered ower of the disputed land In a subsequent authenticated contract of sale Hassan received the cost price ot the land and promised to alter the registration from his name to that or the respondent/plaintiff, salima Jaber However, subsequent to the sale contract, Hassan made a gift of the land to his wife khodra and the Commissioner gave consent to the alternation of registration to the name of khodra But Hassan did not request the covernment's consent though this was provided in the lease, when he made the sale contract with salim

     salim opened a suit against Hassan and his wife khodra for the alteration of the registration to his name in performance of the contract of sale The district Court held that the registration should be altered to the name of the buyer, Salim Jaber This decree was confirmed by the Court of Appeal But the Supreme court held that the sale between Hassan and Salim Jaber was null and void because it contravened the lease since the consent of the Commissioner was not priorly obtained The Supreme Court further held that the registration must remain in the name of khodra because the Commissioner had given his consent to the gift A judgement delivered by Justice Mahamoud A Gasseisa and confirmed by his colleagues made statements of principle It was first stated that:

     Secret dealings which take place through external authentification in order to circumvent the law which prohibts dealing in housing planning ( residential planning) are never considered sale because they involve no ownership; rather, this is  a conditional deal in accordance with the outlined policy made by legislature which provides for it and Courts are to apply the law which the legislature has provided and should not make their own policy which violates the provisions of the law

    It was further stated that:

"     Any attempt to dispose of any land or privilege or disposal which conflicts with provisions of Law is null and void and has no legal effect"

      The Court relied on the provisions of (a) S4 of " Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918,(b) Sections 28 and 29 of Land Settlement and Registration Act, 1925

      In fact, in cases related to the housing policy the Government allots residential lands to citizens who qualify for such allotments People compete and he who gets a specific number of points according to the number of family members win the competition It means that the family members are an essential factor in the allotment of residential lands to citizens In order to protect the family members where the regisiered proprietor might dispose of the land without their consent, the government inserts a condition in the lease that no disposal of such land can be made without its consent

     It has been stated that the decision of the court in the case of Hassan Taha and other V Salima Jaber ( Supra), applied the provisions of sections 28 and of Land settlament and Registration Act 1925 ( ieESRA 1925) and S4 of (the repealed) Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918(ie SDLA 1918)

    What do the previsions of these sections say in the Solution of the legal dispute before us now? S 28 provides:

"   From and after the establishment of an office of land Registry for any province or part of a Province, no land nor charge to which this Act applies except so far as it may be excluded from registration under this Act shall be capable of being transferred, charged of otherwise dealt with except with provisions of this Act and every attempt to transfer, charge except in accordance with provisions of this Act, shall be null and void"

     The provisions of this Act may be broken up into the following ingredients:-

      a-  That provisions of this Act apply as from and after the date Land Registry office is established in a province or part of it;

      b- That any land or charge to which this Act applies shall not be transferred or charged in violation of its provisions;

      c-  That where a land or charge, to which this Act applies is disposed of or charged in violation of its provisions, such disposition or charge shall be null and void and shall have no legal effect

     The case of Hassan Taha and other V salima Jaber, and the case before us, now, are substantively the same principle It follows that provisions of S 28 LSRA 1925 and other sections referred to above apply to both cases

     If we come to the case before us, the first ingredient of S 28 is fulfilled and there is no dispute over it further, for the second ingredient the question is: did the sale of land by the 1st respondent to the applicant violate the provisions of the Land Settlement and Registration Act,  1925? And if so, what is the legal effect? Before answering this question let us try to find out which of the provisions of the Act referred to ( i e LSRA 1925) have been violated by the sale?

     This takes us to the examination of the provisions of S 29 of same Act This section provides: " Nothing contained in this Act shall limit the powers conferred by any legislation rendering necessary the consent of the peoples Executive Council' to any dealing with the land or conferred by SDLRA, 1918 or any Act amending the same nor render valid any transaction made null and void by any such proclamation or Act (i e Acts: 1961; 1973, and 1974)

    From the wording of this section ( S 29) it is obvious that the provisions of LSRA 1925 do not limit or diminish the powers conferred by any other Act which make the consent of the Government ( ie peoples Executive Council) an essential requisite to any disposal or dealing of an individual with a land registered in his name

      In other words, the Act (i e LSRA 1925) recognises as valid the provisions of any law, which imposas that a registered ower of land or proprietor cannot transfer or sell or charge his land, unless the Government of the Peoples' Executive Council has given its written consent

    Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918 is among the Acts expressly mentioned and those provisions of LSRA 1925

   Further, any transaction declared, ( by the provisions of the stated Acts, e g SDLA 1918) null and void cannot be validated by the provisions of the LSRA 1925 It must be stated also that the provisions of any Act which amended the Provisions of the Acts referred to above are recognised by LSRA 1925 So anything declared null and void or any condition imposed by those Acts is recognised by LSRA 1925

     Then what did SDLA 1918 provide in relation to the matter before us? s 4 of sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918 Conferred on thd Peoples' Executive Council ( which is in fact chaired by the Commissioner ) the power to give consent where a registered owner of land intends to dispose or sell his land that section Provided:

"     Every sale, mortgage, or other disposition by a Sudanese of any land, or any right or interest in or over the same and every agreement for sale, mortgage charge or other disposition of the same ( except as a devise by will or lease for a period not exceeding three years ) to which the consent in writing of the people's Executive Council has not been expressed subsequently under S 2 or 3 shall be null and coid"

   Under this section any disposition for which the consent of the Peoples Executive Council ( or in fact, the Commissioner ) has not been priorly obtained is null and void S 19 of Land settlement and Registefation Act, 1925 tells us that a transaction which is declared null and void under Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918 or the Act which has amended ( or repealed it ) it, is also deemed to be null and void under Land Settlement and registration Act 1925

    In 1984, Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act 1918 was repealed by civil transacctions Act 1984 but there are sections of this new Act which correspond with provisions of S 4 ( of Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918 )

    Let us then find out which sections or section on Civil Transactions Act, 1984 which saves the provisions of s4 of Sudanese Disposition Act, 1918?

    Before reference is had to these provisions, I would like to explain the word " usufruct," which has been adopted by the Provisions of Civil Transactions Act, 1984 This word is introduced into use by S559 of same Act for example at clause 4 of this section it is provided:-

"     Any ownership registered as leasehold ( Hiker) shall be deemed ownership of usufruct"

   It is further stated in clause 5:

"   Any ownership acquired in accordance with the provisions of this Act (i e CTA 1984) shall be deemed ownership of the usufruct:

   This means that ownership granted, for example, by registration etc on a person under C T A 1984 is the ownership of usufruct (ie the person who owns things ( by grant ) on the land owned by another eg Buildings, Cultivation etcS 569(1) C T A 1984) The actual owner of the land is God with a trust conferred on the State An individual Citizen on whom ownership of land is conferred enjoys the status of a usufruct

     I explain this word " usufruct because it has not been embodied into the provisions of the other Land Acts early referred to " usufruct" under C T A 1984 is actualy the registered owner of Land according to the Provisions of the other land Acts

   I now come to the relevant Provisions which correspond with S4 of Sudanese Disposition of Lands Act, 1918

   reference is first had to S 569(1) CT A 1984 which states:

 Building,Plantation, canals, channel constructions executed as part of the lawful user of land shall be the property of the owner of the usufruct and he may dispose of it in all manners unless the disposition there of is restricted by the grant instrument or by Special law"

   The words: " restricted by the grant instrument," means in the case before us, restriction imposed by the lease or contract between the Government and Ist respondent ( registered owner )

   The other relevant provision under civil transactions Act, 1984 is S 573(1) which provides:-

"   The proprietor of the usufruct shall be bound to fulfill any condition provided in the contract creating the trust "

"   Trust" here indicates that the land registered in the name of individual is held by him as a trustee of it (while the ultimate owner is the state ) The proprietor ( i e trustee ) of the land is bound to obey conditions imposed by the lease or contract between him and the Government

   The two sections under C T A  1984 tell us that any restriction imposed by lease on the registered owner or proprietor of land (usufruct) must be fulfilled by him Provisions of these sections of C T A, 1925 s are recognized under S 29 of LSRA 1925 Then what happens if he the registered owner of land; neglects or refuses to fulfill the conditions imposed by the lease?

    The answer is provided under ss 28 and 29 of Land settlement and Registration Act, 1925 That dealing with the land in violation of the condition imposed by the lease is null and void

    In the case before us, it has been established that the lease provided that the registered owner (Ist respondent ) could not dispose of the land unless the consent of the commissioner had been obtained The Government with-held its consent because the condition was that any sale or disposal would require the consent of the respondent's first wife (not the second wife) In other words' the government's consent was tied up with the consent of the Ist wife, under the statutory provisions discussed above, the Ist respondent (Awad) was bound to obey or fulfill the condition stipulated in he lease hold But since he did not obey this and contracted to sell the land without the government prior consent, the sale was null and void and has no legal effects This case is different from the cases referred to by the majority judgment

    My learned colleagues see the retraction of the consent of the land authorities as the greatest evil that should be prevented from becoming a part of the judicial precedent

  But I believe that the real danger or the greatest evil is the establishment of a judicial precedent which tends to condone or ignore the Commission of fraud to influence the disposal of lands or land transactions The enactment of S 84 of Land Settlement and Registration Act, 1925 is a recognition of the retraction of the consent or acts done by the land authorities under the influence of fraud Cases where the land authorities have been induced by fraud to register the land in the name of a particular individual are rectified under the provisions of this Section where the fraud has been subsequently proved The Courts cannot  or hold the land authorities to their previous acts or consents which had been induced by fraud Such a Court decision would mean a direct violation of the provisions of S 84 LSRA 1925 It follows further that, if anything contravenes the Sharia principles, it is not the retraction or revocation of the consent of the land authorities; but it is the Commission of fraud to induce a land transfer which contravenes the Sharia rules

   Fraud was committed when the Ist Respondent, Awad, presented the consent of his second wife to the land authorities to induce their consent to the sale Awad intended to make ( by deceit ) the land authorities to believe that the consent of the second wife was in fact that of the Ist wife whose consent was the one stipulated in the leasehold

    On these grounds, I hold that the application for revision ought to be dismissed