YOUSEF ABDEL RAHAM MANSOUR, Applicant-Defendant v. ESTATE OF ABUL GASSIM AHMED HASHIM, Respondents- Plaintiffs
Contract-s-Rescission-s-Innocent misrepresentation ill the description of land
Land Law-Sale of land-Innocent misrepresentation in description=-Rescis-
sian-Extent of error-s-Location and value of land
Land Law-Partition-When partition is completed
1. Where an innocent misdescription of land being sold is of such im-
portance as to produce a mutual mistake as to the substance of the whole
consideration, as where the plot turns out to be in a different spot and on
less valuable soil, the purchaser.may rescind the contract.
2. Partition of registered land is not complete until the separate plots
of land are marked on the ground and on the map, and their ownership
entered in the register.
Kennedy v. Panama &c. Mail Co. (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 580 followed.
Revision
December 3, 1934. Owen C.J.: In. this case the plaintiffs seek
to rescind a contract for the sale of land on the ground. that there is
a difference 10 substance between the plot bargained for and that
obtained.
The facts are short and not in dispute. Sagia 42 (6), Gereif
West, was originally registered in the names of heirs holding in un-
divided shares. In or about November 1931 the heirs applied to the
Mahkama for partition, and in due course an ilam was promulgated
indicating the names of the heirs and their respective shares in terms
of feddans, and also declaring that those 'shares should lie next to one
another beginning at the north end, and continuing according to the
list, as far as the southern boundary of the sagia. Before the decree
was executed, i.e., before the actual physical partition had taken place,
the parties to this appeal started negotiations for the sale of the
defendant's share, an area of about 10 Ieddans, and on a certain
day in December 1932 they duly paid a visit to the sagia. All the
parties were aware of the terms of the ilam, and they all knew that
the actual partition of the land was pending. They all knew, too,
that, according to that ilam, the defendant's plot would be situated
after partition at a certain distance from the northern boundary. It
was therefore of the greatest importance that this northern boundary
should be known. The defendant thought he knew it, and pointed out
to the plaintiffs a certain khor, and, after the parties had made a
rough but satisfactory guess as to the approximate site of the defend-
ant's share, they concluded a sale of that plot for £E.20. None of the
parties intended or contemplated that the subject matter of the sale
was an undivided share. What they thought they were bargaining
for was the plot of land which would be, on partition, the registered
property of the defendant. Unfortunately the defendant was quite
wrong. When the time for partition came, it was found that the
northern boundary of the sagia was a considerable distance to the
north of the khor pointed out by the defendant, and his land there-
fore was in a very different place from that contemplated at the time
of the bargain. Not only 'was it in a different place, but the quality
of the land was different. It was bad land, whereas the other was
good.
So the plaintiffs brought an action for rescission of the contract.
The learned judge of the High Court held that this was a case of
mutual mistake going to the root of the contract and gave judgement
for the plaintiffs accordingly. The defendant has appealed on the
ground that the error was not one of substance, and that in any event
the plaintiffs cannot claim relief in view of their neglect to take the
proper precaution of finding out from the map where the real boundary
was.
I think there can be no doubt that the defendant's misrepresenta-
tion of the boundary was an innocent one. The mistake was mutual,
and the law on the point is clear. When there has been an. innocent
misrepresentation or misapprehension, it does Dot authorize a rescis-
sion unless it is such as to show that there is a complete difference
in substance between what was supposed to be, and what was taken,
so as to constitute a failure of consideration. The difficulty in every
case is to determine whether the mistake is as to the substance of the
whole consideration, going as it were to the root of the matter, or
only to some point, even though a material point, an error as to
which does not affect the substance of the whole consideration.
Kennedy v. Panama &c. Mail Co. (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 580, 587-88
per Blackburn J. It is not enough that the error should, as the
learned judge of the High Court seems to imply, amount "very nearly"
to a failure of consideration. In my view there must be a total failure
of consideration before the courts can order recission, and in this case
the point is whether there was such a failure.
I think there was. The undisputed fact is that the plot bargained
for was a considerable distance from the one obtained. It is admitted
too, that the quality of the land was definitely inferior to that of tbe
land contemplated as the substance of the sale by the parties. I have
no doubt that our courts would not have enforced specific performance
of this sale. Surely the position of a plot of land is of the very essence
of the contract for its sale. The plot obtained is a completely different
one from that bargained for, and 1 would be prepared to say, in such
a case, that there is a total failure of consideration, irrespective of
the fact that the difference in quality between the plots is great or
small as the case may be. t The fact that the plot obtained was, as
described by the judge, gebel sakit, is, in my view, irrelevant. The
point is that the plaintiffs, labouring under a mistake induced by the
innocent misrepresentation of the vendor, have bought Blackacre when
both vendor and they thought they were buying Whiteacre. I agree
with the learned judge that this is a case for recission.
The defendant's other point, that the purchasers ought to have
made sure, has no substance. The error arose from the vendor's
own representation. The purchasers were induced to buy on the
strength of it, and the vendor has nobody to blame but himself.
I must therefore dismiss the appeal, and in doing so I would like
to emphasise in particular my agreement with that part of the learned
iudge's judgement which deals with partition. Registered land is not
partitioned unless and until the separate plots of land are marked on
the ground and on the map, and their ownership duly entered in the
register. Until this operation is complete, the land must be regarded
as held in undivided shares.
Application dismissed

