(MAJOR COURT CONFIRMATION)

SUDAN GOVERNMENT v. ITENG LADO

AC.CP.485-1963

 Principles

·  Criminal Law—Murder—Punishment for—Penal Code, s. 255—Homicide committed in accordance with local superstitution

Because when accused murdered her son she was acting in conformity with strong local custom and superstition and therefore according to custom believed that she committed no offence by the killing, the death sentence is commuted to life.

Judgment

M. A. Abu Rannat C.J. January 2, 1964 :—The facts are short and simple.

The accused is a very primitive woman who lived at Agoro village of Torit District. She had a son who was born with one testicle and it appears that in the locality in which they live, they considered his presence as a bad omen. She therefore decided to get rid of him. On August 26, 1962, she prepared a poisonous beverage known as “kambo” and gave it to him. The boy drank it and died after a few hours.

It is therefore clear that the accused caused deceased’s death and that she intended to cause his death. There is no possibility of raising any defence on her behalf and I therefore confirm the finding of murder and death sentence.

This is one of the peculiar cases where superstition led to the killing of. a small boy by his own mother.

The accused is a primitive woman who was living in the village Agoro of Torit District. She had a son about ten years old, who was born with one testicle. With the growth of the child the testicle became large and turned to be a “kooka,” and, as is well known, the inhabitants of that locality do not wear clothes and nearly all of them are naked. The scene of the boy with a “kooka” terrified them and they considered it a bad omen, and therefore they started to subject his mother to severe pressure and humiliation. At last she succumbed to the pressure and decided to get rid of her son.

On August   26, 1962, she prepared a beverage made of burnt dead leaves which is known locally as “kombo.” The “kombo is poisonous; the report from stack laboratory shows that it contained 5 per cent. sodium hydroxide which was caustic and would cause lesion which may lead to death. Then she gave the “kambo” to the boy and forced him to drink it, and consequently the boy died after a few hours. The court found the accused woman guilty of murder and sentenced her to death. The court was no doubt right in its decision which I confirmed.

The difficult point is whether the death sentence should be carried out.

On November  7, 1953, I tried a similar case at Kadugli and imposed the alternative sentence of imprisonment for life which was confirmed by the then Chief Justice (W. O’B. Lindsay). In that case, a boy was born blind and his parents agreed with the boy’s uncle to bury him alive. In March 1951, the parents went to their farm, leaving the blind boy alone in the house, and according to a previous agreement, the uncle took the boy to the cemetery and buried him alive. In .my note for sentence I wrote the following:

“           The accused is a superstitious rustic. According to custom of the community in which he lives, he believes that he committed no offence. Although this case is not covered by the schedule to Criminal Court Circular No. 26, we think that such cases form a class of their own, and should not be treated as cases of premeditation or in circumstances of peculiar atrocity.”

 In the Nuba mountains they had a custom whereby any deformed child should be buried alive, as they believe his presence with them would cause harm to the community.

The then Governor Kordofan minuted on the sentence as follows:

“I agree with the court that, in view of the customs and superstitions of the community among which the accused lived, the death penalty should not be exacted. Such practice, however, must be stopped, and treated with the rigour of the law, and no less than a life sentence of imprisonment would be adequate.”

In view of the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, I beg that the death sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life.

Editors’ Note.—See Note, Punishment of Homicide Offenders—Exceptious to Penal Code, s. 251 (1963) S.L.J.R. 229, 234(.