Case No.:

AC.CR-RE V. r- 1956

Court:

Court of Criminal Appeal

Issue No.:

1961

Principles

·  Road Traffic—Road Traffic Ordinance. s. 49 (3) - Meaning of " owned by the government”

·  Road Traffic—Road Traffic Ordinance. s.16 (i)—Employing unlicensed drivers—Lack of knowledge of inadequacy of driver’s licence—good defence

·  Criminal Law—Merger—Road Traffic Ordinance. s. 23. and Penal Code. s. 284 (2)

Accused No. 1. with he permission of Acused No. 2. test-drove a lorry for government use without insurance or an adequate driving licence in a manner dangerous to the public and so caused grievous hurt. Accused No. 2 did not know Accused No. 1 had only a provisional licence. Accused No. 1 was convicted of:
driving without a licence under Road Traffic Ordinance. s.16 (i) [now Road Traffic Act, 1962 (1962 Act No.5 ), S. 16 (1)];
driving without insurance under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 49 (1) [ Road Traffic Act. 1962 (1962 Act No.(5). 53 (1) ];
.3 dangerous driving under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23 [ Road Traffic Act, 1962 (1962 Act No. (5 ),s. 24];
quash Qr  negligent action causing grievous hurt under Penal Code, s. 284 (2).

Accused No. 2 was convicted of:
allowing Accused No. 1 to drive without adequate licence under Road Traffic Ordinance. s.16 (1) [ now Road Traffic Act, 1962 (1962 Act No. 5), s. 16 (1)];
permitting Accused No. 1 to drive without insurance under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 49 (1) [now Road Traffic Act, 1962 (1962 Act No.5 ), S. 53 (1)].
Accused No. 2 appealed. The High Court quashed the convictions under Road Traffic Ordinance, ss. 16 (1) and 49 (1), and confirmed those under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23, and Penal Code, S. 284 (1). Police applied for Revision.
Held: (1) Convictions of Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 under Road
Traffic Ordinance, s. 49 (1), quashed. A vehicle being tested for Government
use is “on Government use” and therefore a ‘ vehicle owned by the
Government” within the meaning of Road Traffic Ordinance. 5. 49 (3) ]now
Road Traffic Act. 1962 (1962 Act No. 5), s. 53 (3)].

(2)  Accused No. 2’s lack of knowledge of the inadequacy of Accused No. 1’s licence is a good defence to the charge under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16 (1).
Obiter dictum: Since the offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23, merges into the offence under Penal Code. s. 284 (2), there should not have been separate convictions and punishments under these two sections. Since sentences run concurrently under the convictions under these two sections, convictions need not be reversed.

Judgment

( CRIMINAL REVISION )

SUDAN GOVERNMENT v. AHMED EL DAW MOHAMED AND ANOTHER

 AC.CR-RE V. r- 1956

R. C. Soni J. February 16, 1956 :—The charges in this case against Accused No. 1, Ahmed El Daw Mohamed:

1. That he drove lorry No. 9807 at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public and as a result collided against Mohamed El Hag El Sadig, thus committing an offence under Road Traffic Ordinance.

S. 23.

2 . That he drove lorry No. 9807 along the road without having a driving licence, thus committing an offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16 (1).

3. That he drove lorry No. 9807 when its insurance was invalid thus committing an offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 49 (1), and

.4  That by his dangerous driving he caused grievous hurt to Mohamed El Hag El Sadig, thus committing an offence under Penal Code, s. 284 (2).

The second accused, El Rasheed El Sharif El Makawl was charged with:

1. Allowing the first accused to drive lorry No. 9807 without a driving licence, thus committing an offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16 (I), and
2. Causing lorry No. 9807 to be driven when its insurance was invalid, thus committing an offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 49 (1)

The magistrate found both the accused guilty under the sections charged, and convicted and sentenced the first accused to various terms of imprisonment and various fines. He convicted the second accused and imposed various fines on him.

The second accused appealed. In the appeal the learned judge of the appellate court quashed the convictions of both the accused under the two se of the Road Traffic Ordinance. The chief inspector has put in a revision petition in this court, urging that the convictions of both the accused under both the sections of the Road Traffic Ordinance should have been upheld and has urged there has been a contravention of Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 17.

There was no charge regarding Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 17, and no evidence had regarding the facts of that section. It is not proper to go into the contravention of Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 17, at this stage.

Regarding Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 49, it must be observed that under clause (3) of section 49, the section does not apply to the user on official duty of a Government vehicle. The lorry in tile present case was a Government vehicle. It was being tested for Go use and must be regarded as being on Government use. The provisions of clause (3) do apply, and no charges can be maintained under Road Traffic Ordinance, S. 49.

Regarding Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16, it must be observed that Accused No. 2 did not know that Accused No. 1 had no proper licence. In fact Accused No. 1 had a provisional licence, though it covers learning to drive cars. There is no proof that Accused No. 2 knew the contents of this licence (Document iii). Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16 (1), in terms applies to drivers only having no proper licence. The charge was that Accused No. 2 allowed Accused No. 1 to drive without a licence. For a conviction under this section the person charged must know that the person he is allowing has no proper licence. There must be an intention to commit an offence of abetment by allowing the offence to be committed. If I have a car and I am told by my friend that he has a driving licence I shall not under ordinary circumstances act as a police inspector and ask my friend to produce the licence for my inspection. I shall ordinarily trust him. The second accused did nothing more In my opinion the second accused was rightly found not guilty by the learned judge in appeal.

Regarding Accused No. 1, the offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 16 (1), is proved. But the injury which has resulted and for which punishment has been awarded may be deemed such as to merit passing over this offence in inflicting punishment. I notice that there has been a conviction under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23, also. The offence under Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23, has merged into the bigger offence under Penal Code, s. 284 (2), and there should not have been two punishments. I notice that for all practical purposes the punishment is single as sentences for convictions under both sections have been ordered to run concurrently.

For criminally negligent acts, the Indian Penal Code has four sections (sections 304A, 338, 337 and 336), which are applicable according to the consequences caused. The corresponding sections in the Sudan are Penal Code, ss. 256, 284 (2) and s. 284 (1), for the first three. Indian Penal Code, s. 336, resembles Sudan Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 23. Road Traffic Ordinance, S. 23, deals with the special case of a motor-vehicle when no injury has actually resulted. In conception of law it is criminal negligence or recklessness in disregarding the civic duty of circumspection that is at the basis of the offence. Two punishments may be permissible, but are not usual.

M. A. Abu Rannat C.J. February 16, 1956 :—On application by the police, I see no reason to intervene.