Case No.:

HC-CR-REV.6oi.ip6i

Court:

The High Court

Issue No.:

1962

Principles

·  Criminal Law—Contempt of court—Penal Code, s. i66—Must prove intention to insult

Accused, an advocate was summarily tried and convicted under Penal Code, s. 166, for contempt of court because he replied to the court in a loud voice and refused to leave the court when ordered to do so. He applied for revision.
Hield: The prosecution under Penal Code. s. 166 must prove intention to insult; mere use of a loud voice must be irritating, but need not be intended to Insult. Conviction is quashed.

Judgment

(CRIMINAL REVISION)

SUDAN GOVERNMENT v. ABDEL RAHMAN KOURTI

HC-CR-REV.6o1.1961

Advocate: Hussein 0. Wanni ... for the accused

M. Y. Mudawi P.1. October 7, 1961: — on July 11, 1961, Sayed Abdel Rahman Kourti, an advocate of Khartoum, was summarily tried by Police Magistrate, Omdurman, and convicted under Penal Code, s. x66. He was sentenced to pay a fine of three pounds and in default of payment he was to go to prison for 10 days. It is against this conviction and sentence that this revision is brought before the court.

The record of the case, which is unfortunate in its brevity, reveals that advocate Kourti was convicted “for making a reply to the court in a loud voice and for refusal to leave the court when ordered so to do.” I believe I am entitled to assume that the order to leave was made as a consequence of the loud reply. The record does not show the exact words uttered by advocate Kourti.

The object of Penal Code, s. i66, is to provide judges with power to control their courts and to preserve their dignity against deliberate insults or vulgar interruptions, be they from members of the Bar or the public. It is a valuable power, which should, in my opinion, be sparingly used if ever it is intended to produce the best results. Frequent use may breed familiarity, which will for sure result in contempt of the power itself. In Penal Code, s. i66, intention to insult is the most important ingredient of the crime. In trying to find out this intention the court must bear in mind the fact that litigants and pleaders are apt to be over-enthusiastic in pursuing their real or supposed rights. It will be most unfair if enthusiasm is confused with intent to insult, and if eagerness is confused with deliberate interruption. The court must also be clear about the rights and duties of the members of the Bar, who are in every respect equal to the members of the Bench and should therefore be treated with the respect and cordiality they deserve. They have a sacred right to be heard with all attention and to remain in court as long as they observe court manners. It is also their duty to live up to the ethics of the profession and to help in maintaining the pure and gentle atmosphere that prevails in the courts of this country. In Ratanlal, Law of Crimes 577 (19th ed. 1956) it is observed that, “there ought to be a spirit of give and take between the Bench and the Bar….

and every little persistence on the part of a pleader should not be turned into an occasion for a criminal trial unless the pleader’s conduct is so clearly vexatious as to lead to the inference that his intention is to insult or to interrupt the court.”

In the case now before the court, advocate Kourti is said to have spoken to the court in a loud voice and to have refused to leave when told to go out. Undoubtedly a loud voice, as such, has never been an insult to the listener. It may be a bit annoying or even irritating, but it cannot and should not be treated as a cause for invoking Penal Code, s. 166. Indeed,

the attitude of the court with regard to such simple irritations should be one of dignified tolerance unless it becomes very clear that the person involved is deliberately trying to misbehave. Again the court was not acting reasonably when it ordered an advocate to leave just because his voice was loud. I-us refusal to leave was not wrong.

In view of this I quash conviction and sentence under Penal Code, s. i66, and order that the fine be refunded.