Case No.:

HC-REV186-1960

Court:

The High Court

Issue No.:

1961

Principles

·  Landlord and tenant—Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4—Standard rent—Office in an office building

The question o the amount of standard rent due for one office in a building of many offices is not to be decided under Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4 (b), but under Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4 (d), by the Governor

Judgment

(HIGH COURT)

SEFERIAN & CO., LTD. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO.

HC-REV186-1960

.

Advocates: El Rasheed Nayel…….. for the plaintiffs—applicant

                      Mubarek Zarroug ……. for the defendants—respondent

A. M. Imam J. March 29, 1961 :—The facts Of this eviction case are clearly set out in the record. The part of these facts, however, which is relevant for determining this application is as follow

Applicants (and plaintiffs) are the owners of the plot known as No. 2, Block 6 A,W., Khartoum. The land on which the premises were built was bought by the plaintiff’s legator in 1924 or 1925. The building was constructed during 1950 and it was ready for occupation early in 1951. The respondents (and defendants) entered the premises when new in March 1951.

The premises in dispute is an office among many in a first storey building. The first contractual rent of this office was £5.20 monthly, which the respondents consider as the standard rent, while applicants consider it to be £5.37.o z, calculated on the basis of the value of the land and that of constructing the building under Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4 (b), which the cow below accepted and decreed that accordingly the standard rent shall be £5.25 monthly.

As I see it I think Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4 (d), * not section 4 (b) is applicable in this sort of case. Section 4 (b) reads:

‘Standard rent’ means with reference:

)b) to new premises—an annual sum equal to 12 per centum of the cost price of the construction of such premises plus 6 per centum of the value of the land

It should be clear that the reference is here made to the premises in dispute. In this case the “premises” in dispute is a single detached office, one of a block of offices, in a first storey building. Th whole building and the land upon which it is built is not the premises in dispute. The standard rent of the office cannot he reached by cold mathematical calculations of the value of the whole land and buildings and then dividing it by the number .of offices. The court below has wasted much time and trouble in going into these calculations. It could be understood that were the whole building let to one tenant then it would he section 4 (b) that should be applicable. Such a hare calculation, which is definitely contrary to section 4 (b) cannot be held to fix the standard or even a reasonable rent, towards the latter of whch the courts efforts seemed to have been directed; for to fix the reasonable rent of such a detached office can be fixed not by considering only the actual value of the buildings but also several other determining facts, as the situation, the scene, the frontage, etc., etc.

Under the present Ordinance the court is not empowered to set itself up as an assesor or valuer of rent; it can only find the standard rent by strict application of the sections dealing with the fixing of standard and increases of standard rent. This  power of assessing the standard rent which was given by former Ordinance. i.e., The Defence of the Sudan (Civil Justice Emergency Amendment  Regulations. 1941. and the original Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1947, is non-existent in the present Ordinance. The present Ordinance provided only that in case a case does not fall under one of the sections then section 4 d) is to be applied. Under section 4 (d) the standard rent is to be fixed by the Governor.

I think the objections raised by the learned advocate for respondent are not to the point. He maintains that the process whereby such rent is arrived at is open to abuse and suggests that some procedure should be laid down by this court for the aid and guidance of the Governor. I doubt whether this court has power to fix such rules though I think the former suspicious accusation may well be founded. In fixing such a rent the Governor cannot act arbitrarily but judicially. He is not, however, bounded by the Rent Restriction Ordinance, i.e., he fixes a reasonable rent which the courts have to accept as being the standard rent. In doing so, therefore, he can take into account other factors, besides the value of both the land and the buildings. I refrain from stating whether such a is immutable or unappealable or is not susceptible to attach

on any legal ground or other. The fact remains that as the law now stands the Governor is the sole authority for fixing the standard rent where it is not provided for. If this law is bad or unworkable then it can always be amended or changed.

For the above this application should fail and the standard rent is to fixed by the Governor under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4 (d(.

I make no order as to costs.