(PROVINCE COURT) SUDAN GOVERNMENT v. MEKKI EL AMIN SULEIMAN PC-CR-REV-32-1963 El Obeid
Principles
· Prices and Charges—Vicarious criminal liability—Owner of bakery not criminally liable for act of servant selling bread deficient in weight
The owner of a bakery who was not present when bread deficient in weight was sold by a labourer in the bakery is not criminally liable under Prices and Charges Order, 1955 (1955 L.R.O. No.12).
Judgment
M. E. Mobarak P.J. March 14, 1963:- El Amin Suleiman was on March 5, 1963, tried and convicted by Abdulla Ahmed Eisa, NS-2o- 1963 (Nuhud), under Regulation 9 of the Price and Charges Order, I955 (1955 L.R.O. No. 12) in respect of bread short in weight and sentenced to imprisonment for one month and confiscation of the flour he had in his bakery. The court ordered that particulars of the conviction be endorsed in his trading licence and recommended him for special treatment. I sent you a telegram yesterday directing his release from gaol, pending disposal of this application received from advocate Abdel Rahim Hag Hamad on his behalf.
On application by advocate Abdel Rahim Hag Hamad on behalf of accused I refuse confirmation of finding, sentence and orders. So inform the accused please.
The relevant part of paragraph 9 of the Prices and Charges Order, 1955 (1956 L.R.O. No. 12) reads:
“No seller of any goods whatsoever shall demand a price higher than that which may have been fixed, authorised or notified under these orders.”
In this case it has been found that the police informant Nafar Dawood Ahmed Fadlalla (P.W. 2) purchased six loaves at P.2 each from the baking of the accused at Abu Zabad on February 26, 1963. Each of these loaves, it has been proved, was weighed and was found deficient in weight, i.e., less than 10 wagias. This was sufficiently proved in court. It was not the accused himself who sold the loaves to informant. P.W. 2, the informant, stated at page 8 of the record: “The accused was not present when I purchased the bread. A labourer in the baking sold the bread to me.” From this it is clear that the accused was neither the “seller” nor did he personally “demand” a price higher than the fixed one for bread, i.e., P.2 for 10 wagias of bread. The fact that the baking was owned by the licensee in the name of the accused does not make him personally liable criminally for the acts of his servants. The persons who might have been properly prosecuted in respect of this matter are P.W. 2, Hashim Nimir Kadofour, and P.W. 6, Mohamed Ali El Bushra, who actually sold the loaves of bread, delivered them to the informant and received the price thereof from him. I direct that they now be so prosecuted. It is stated in 10 Halsbury, Laws of England 267 (3rd ed. 1955):
“In general a person is not criminally liable for an act or omission unless he has himself committed or omitted the act or authorised or known of or shut his eyes to the commission or omission. Consequently a principal or master is not generally criminally liable for the acts or omissions of his agents or servants whatever his civil liability may be; it is not to be inferred that because he has employed the agent or servant in the conduct of business that he has given him authority to commit crimes, and it is immaterial whether the act or omission is one for which he is liable civilly in an action for damages.”
It was wrong to refer to the previous convictions of the accused before the finding. I refer in this respect to pages 3, 4, 5, and 15 of the record.
Editor’s Note.—Accord, Sudan Government v. Mohamed El Faki Abdulla HC-CR-REV-408- 1962, (1962) S.L.J.R. 155.

