(Province Court) MOHAMED GUMA’A ADAM v MOHAMED YOUSIF PC-REV-18-1963 El Fasher
Principles
· Tort—Animals—Scienter action—Camel bite—Knowledge of dangerous character
· Tort—Animals—Scienter action—Camel is not dangerous by nature—judicial notice
· Evidence—judicial notice—Dangerous nature of animal—Camels
(i) In order for owner to be liable for damage done by his animal it must be proved that he knew or ought to have known of the animal’s dangerous character.
(ii) As a matter of law a camel is not dangerous by nature.
(iii) Court may take judicial notice of the dangerous quality of camels.
(iv) A history of one prior bite by a camel does not make it individually vicious by nature.
Judgment
Abdel Mageed Hassan P.J. June 15 1963 :—The plaintiff, Mohamed Guma’a Adam, filed this civil suit on December 26, 1962, in the District Court, El Fasher, DC-CS-230-1962 He alleged that the defendant’s camel had bitten him on his left arm, which had to he amputated. Plaintiff further alleged that the camel was given into plaintiff’s custody for safe keeping by defendant who knew of the camel’s propensity to bite, a fact unknown to plaintiff.
The following are the facts found below. All plaintiff’s allegations were found true it was proved that the camel on one previous occasion had bitten a man; this fact was known to defendant when the camel was given into plaintiff’s custody.. Plaintiff was not informed of this. The District Court gave judgment for plaintiff for £S.80 and defendant has brought this appeal, stating in toto:
“I have a raging camel, although I was unaware of this propensity. This camel bit the plaintiff’s hand while in his custody. The hand had to be amputated by the doctor. He filed a suit against me before the Resident Magistrate, who passed judgment for him of £S.80 and £S.8 Costs. Your Honour, I have nothing besides this camel, and so I file this appeal.”
The owner of .a dangerous animal is liable for damage done by it if he knew or ought’ to have known of the particular animal’s dangerous character. If the animal is dangerous by nature of its species, e.g., a tiger or a lion scienter is presumed. If the species of animal is not naturally dangerous to man, plaintiff must prove defendant’s scienter, defendant’s knowledge of the vicious propensities of the particular animal. Whether or not a species of animal is to be classed as naturally dangerous or not is a question of law.
“The reason why this is a question of law and not a question of fact is because it is a matter of which judicial notice has to be taken”: Salmond, Torts 605, n. 10 (13th ed., Heuston, 1961), and accompanying text. See Cross, Evidence 137 (2nd ed. 1963), and the discussion therein of McQuaker v. Goddard (1940) 1 .B. 687;(1940)1 All E.R. 471, a case in which a camel in a zoo bit a man. It was held in the Mc Quaker case after examination of books and experts on camels that it was not natural for a camel in a zoo to attack a man. “When taking judicial notice a judge repeatedly makes use of his general knowledge”: Cross, op. cit., at138.. It is a matter of general knowledge that Sudanese camels are not dangerous to mankind. The court may take judicial notice of this fact. The question is therefore whether the defendant knew of his particular camel’s dangerous propensities. A history of one prior bite by the particular camel may not make it a camel of vicious propensities. This is a matter of fact to be proved below. Not being convinced that the court below thoroughly examined this question, I have quashed the decree below and ordered a new trial on this issue.
Editor’s Note.—See also Ali Babiker Yousif El Tahir v. Jahal Ahmed Beshir, PC-REV-76-1962 (El Obeid), (1965) S.L.J.R. 48.

