(COURT OF APPEAL)

GASIM IDRIS v. SAEEDA EL SHAFIE TALHA

AC-REV-961-1969

Principles

  Landlord and Tenant—” The actual rent payable “—Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 10 (A), amended 1969—Means rent in fact paid by tenant—May be the standard rent or not

According to Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 10 (A), amended 1969, the words “the actual rent payable,” mean the rent which was in fact being paid by the tenant on August 1, 1969, whether it was the standard rent as defined in Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4, or more or less.

Advocate: Abdalla Mohamed El Daw for the applicant

Judgment

Mahdi Mohamed Ahmed J. February 5, 1970 :—This application poses the question of interpretation of the recent amendment to the Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 10 (A), which runs as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Ordinance, and as from the first day of August 1969 the actual rent payable by the tenant (including the sub-tenant) to the landlord for residential premises shall be reduced as hereinafter mentioned, pro vided that the reduced rent shall, for the purpose of this Ordinance, be the standard rent.”

The controversy turns round the meaning of the words “the actual rent payable.” The trial court as well as the Province Court held that it means the rent which was in fact being paid by the tenant on August I, 1969, whether it was the standard rent as defined in the Rent Restriction Ordinance, s. 4, or more or less. Hence it was held that the standard rent of all premises covered by the amendment shall be the rent payable on August 1, 1969, minus the permitted reduction of 20 or 25 per cent. as the case may be. Applicant’s counsel on the other hand contends that the words “the actual rent payable” should be interpreted to read “the lawful rent payable” or, in other words the standard rent. In his contention the standard rent of the premises covered by the amendment shall be the standard rent as defined in section 4 of the above Ordinance minus the permitted reduction. He urges that the intention of the legislature is to protect the tenant and any other interpretation will be inconsistent with such intention.

It is a fundamental rule of construction that when

“the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.” Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed., 1962), p. 2.

Hence a legislature is presumed to have intended what it actually ex pressed. In fact when clear and unequivocal terms were used the need for interpretation does not arise at all. Only in the case of equivocation or ambiguity are the courts justified in seeking the intent of the legislature elsewhere than in the text of the statute.

It now remains to consider whether the phrase “the actual rent pay able” suffers from any ambiguity or is susceptible of more than one meaning. The word “actual” in its literal meaning denotes a factual situation, an existing state of affairs. Hence the phrase “the actual rent payable” means the rent in fact paid by the tenant. This may well be the standard rent or might not be. If the legislature intended the rent which ought to be paid it would have used the word “lawful” instead of “actual” or the concise term “the standard rent.” In the Arabic version the words used have the same import.

I therefore conclude that the words used by the legislature are plain and clear and not susceptible of any other meaning.

“If there is one rule of construction for statutes and other documents, it is that you must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used,” op. Cit. p. 2.

Hence when the words are plain and unequivocal as in the present case there is no scope for construction. It is the duty of the courts to give to the words used their normal and natural sense:

“The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient.” Op. cit. p. 5.

Hence the contention of the learned counsel for applicant that the words “the actual rent payable” be construed as meaning the standard rent is contrary to the canons of construction and cannot be entertained.

This application is therefore summarily dismissed.