.AIUfED MtJ.JHTAR v .Applicant - Plaintif tlM KALTOtlM MOHAMED HASS.AN .AND .ANOTHER '.
Land Law - Pre-emption - Degree of cousanguinity - Computation thereof.
Lund LliW - Pre-empLioa.- When right arises - Date of sale - Detennillation
thereof - ilunlen of proof. "
§tlltute - Interpretetioll - .Bearing of Civil, Common, Callon and Shada L'aw
011 l're-ernpti on Orliinanpe 1928.
Words alld Ph r e se s - .';Rc ltlti ve to fourth degree. 11
L\SillC~ the Pre-emption Ordinance 1928 fo.Llows the ci vi I 18w,
two per SOilS who nregreat-grandsons of the same ancestor are
r e La t i ve s, to the sixth degree and 8 sale of land between them
g i ve s right to a right of pre-emption.
·2.Prirna faciefhe date of sale is that 01 the sale deed,
but it may be shown tlt't; i IS not so and that the actual sale
was c o.up l e t ed by ((1; sal'e and (b) ent.ry into possession on
s o.n e O~;l(!i' ,.Cite.
AUJeL ~ariw Ali Mu1ah v. Heirs of Medina Mohamed Idris1
J Sud an Law Reports (Civil) 1945, AC-APP-4-L\)44.
Pre-empLion Ordinance 1918.
Pre-emptioll Ordinance hl28, s , 7 (c).
Maclagl:lfl, C.J.
fhis is a cuse under the
,', ,-, .. ")<,,0.;,, Lj·,li,." •• c e [928, an d it concerns Hawa sha No. 24 'rabga, which is
.re~l'tpc~d 1.1 l~l" liitifte u I the Sudan Govenunent and was allotted under a 99
(1; Si t.t.nn a b i u t '81 !leg Ahmed, (2) Un l\.altou
At some stage Sittuno
,.:(. Ei ,1('L '~;;i".·U s o Iu b"c .,):,n'e to Ah.o e d Muxh t.u r , the applicant an d plaintiff,
, ~~ .~'_"l_tG.110 u i u t Mohamed aa~,.all s o Ld her share to Omar '&1 Hag .Ahmed, an
'.:- ~y are the r-e sp o nd eu t s and del en d ent.s
Ahm~J hlu~htar1 as a co-owner in the Hawasha, is see~ing to exercise his
r i sh t ql fH·., emplion with r e sp o c t, t o thp sale by Urn Kaltoum (first defend,nnt)
He failed in the Shendi District
Cr. u r t., '),; :,,0 ~I ·,;,,,16 t.h a t he could n o i pro ve that his purchase from Sitt8na wa$
prior to that of Omar B1 Hag'l purchase from um Kaltoum..And he
failed again in the Nor~heru Circuit High Court on the ground. tbat U. Kaltou.
and Omar Bl Hag were relative. to the tbird degree, and that therefore, in
accordance witb I.ction 7 {c} of the Pr •••• ptioD Ordinance, 1928, no right
of pre-empt! 011 aroe ••
In our view, thil latter decilion wal clearly wrong.
(c) where a sale tal£es place b-etwee
''No right of pre-emption relatives to the fourth
between vendor and purchaser muet not exceed the fourth degree.
is this relationlhjp determined?
Now how
rhere is no dispute a. too the family tree, the comPion ance.tor of the
firlt and second defendants is Hag Ahmed Abu Dabba, wbo w •• the great-grand
father of each. I'he learued Judge of the High Court, on the advice of the
Sh~ria Kadi, held that the defendant I were relativel to the third degree (of
BIir.;Ahmed Abu Dahba,Thi. il true enough; but it is UQt the problem
before t.he Cour We are al~ed to say within tbe lIeaning of the Pre...,emption
Ordinance, what is the degree of rela.tionship between o..ar and Om :l(altoum.
Weblter'. Ney International Dict~on8ry puts it 88 folloW8 I
"The degrees of lineal con8anguinity are reckoned as
one degree for each person in the li~e of delcent,
exclusive of him from whom tbe computation begin ••
I'hi. i. so ar the Ci vil; Canon and Commoll Law. At
tbe Civil Law, the degree of consanguinity between
col1aterala is recknoned by proceedi.ng from one up ro the
common allcestor and then down to tbe other.At the
.CommoD and the Canon Law the degrees between collaterals
are found by takinl the number from the commou ancee.tor to
ei ther, or the more remote of them Ito
If therefore the dearee of relationlhip rehrred to in the Pre-emption
o rdillance ia to be detenni ned by the Ci vil Law, tben Omar and U. KaltoU!ll are
relatl vea of the Ii xth degree, and plainti ff'. chill is Dot barredl but if it
ia to be d.tenained by the Common or Canon Law, then they are relativ~1 of tbe
third d'ire.~and he i. barred.
!niland recognins no riaht of pre-emption, .0 that tbe drafterl of our
Pre-emption Ordinance "ere not following any precept of English Civil La;". '
What then il the hi.tory of our Pre-emption Ordinance We bave before
u. dicta from no lesser an authority than Sir Wasey Sterry"dated November
28, 1904, declaring t.hat no right of pre-emption 'Was recognised in the Sudan
except for tne purp08e of dealing with undivided owner.hip of land, and tben
it abould be dealt wi th a. an acti on for, parti ~i on. 'HoweYer, there Clan
be 10 doubt tbat the Sudan Co'urts did, recognise 80me right. of ,pre-emption,
and in order to ootain 10lle measure of uniformity some regulations 'Were is.ued
ill 1913. These regulation. were ba.ed on the provilion. of tbe
ElYptian Decree of March 23, 1901, and they were the forerunner of our
Pre-emptioo'Ordinance of 1918.
Now, as we followed the Egyptian Law, ~t might appear that our
intentioD was to determine this question of the degree of relationship
by the Sharia Law and not by the Civil Law, in which ca.e the Tiew of the
learned Judge of the High Court, Northern Circuit would be ript.We
caD, however, state with some confidence that this is not .0. To
begin with the Sharia Law, 80 we are in!ormed, does not reco,nise any
right of pre-emption between relatives, but only between co-owners and
adjoining owners So that, in stating the degrees of relationship to
the learned judge, the Sharia -adi was dealing with the law of inte.tate
succession and not that of pre-emption.To continue, owing to a
|
For the original draft of our ~918 |
purely fortuitous circumstance, we are left in no doubt at all a. to the
intention of our legislators.
Ordinance read.
"Sales betweeu relatives to the third degree
do not give rise to 11 right, of pre-eI'lptinn".
The word"third" was crossed out and IIfourth" substituted, with the
mar~iri81 nol1e that tlQ~,~~rwise it would not inclUde first cousins". Under
the Canon. aud Common Law relati ves of the third degree includes second
cousins, whereaa under' the Civil Law first cousins are relatives of the
fourth degree.
There is therefore DO doubt at all that our Pre-emption Ordinance
follows the Civil Law, and the learned High Court Judge was wrong in finding
that Un KaltoUIII and Omar were relati vea to the thi rd degree. They are:'
relatives to the .ixth degree, so plai'ltiff's right of pre-emption cannot be
excluded under section ,l,,(c) of the Ordinance.
It remains to deal with this case on ita _erits.
Under the Pre-emption Ordinance 1928 the right of pre-emption only arise.
"upon aale" of the property ill que.tioll. (See the judpent of the learn~d
Advocate General Mr~ Ma~t~~ordato, in Abd,l Karim Ali Mulah v. Heirs of
Medina Mohamed Idria, AC-APP-4-1944, (unreported). The aole issue before
the Court is therefore "waa the sale b7. Sittana to Ahmed W~tar prior in time
to that by U. Kol toUIII to ~",r EI Hag?" If it waa, then phi nti ff must'
• ucceed.If it ~as not he fail •Now how i. th, date of aale to be determined ,?
Al though thi a is
registered 'land, neither the date of regi.tration n~r the date of applicati~n
f6r regi atrati OD is much pide, for the laud was formerly karu land, whi eh,
to f'aci li tate cui ti vati on, was expropri ated by the Sudan Government and, aft er
being split up into regular ahaped hawaahaa, was reallotted to the original
owner. on long leave. This, of course, p~t a great deal of work on
the Land Registry and aalea, SUch as the~e, could not be registered on demand .
as the·aIYotmenC-to-_'the-Tendor_h.ad. Dot·been registered. It i. therefore
for the Court to decide a. a fact whi eh of these two salee was the fi rat in
time.
The burden of proof 'Was in the first place on plaintiff to show that his
purchase from Sittana was before tha~ of Omar II Hag trom um K.ltoum. He
hils been able to .hi ft that burden by .howing that the date of hi s nati ve
deed of sale and the date of his eventual registration were prior in time to
those of Olllar 1:1 Hag.'Was, in fact, the earlier.
It was then on Omar 11 Hag to prove that his sale'
In the District Court he was successful, for
he called evidence thet he had both paid' for and, through oue Mohamed Fadlalla,
ta~en possession of hi s land pri or to the date of plai nti ff' s nati ve deed of
sale.
Before this Court plaintiff has alleged that, ill fact, he paid for his
land lOllg before in Omdul'Inall, snd entered into posseasion through one Saleh
Ahmed Il'RufaL His deed of sale being held up till he visited Metemma,
and was able to execute it before the vendors relations.
Plaintiff further
alleges that he sought to prove this in the District Court, bUlo thlit .the judge~
thinking he was just trying to tell a better story than his opponent, would not
bear him.
The fact. remains that the -lueation of the dates of these sales, 011 which
the wbole case hangs, was not fully gone into in the District Court, and we
consider that the case should go back to that Court for this to be dOlle. Prima
facie the dates of the sales are those of the sale deeds; but it is open to
either party to show that this is not so, and that the actual sale was completed
by (a> sale, and (b) entry into possession on some other ,late.There should
be ample local evidence as to whether Saleh Ahmed 1:1 Rufai took possession for
plaintiff before or after Mohamed Fadlalla took possessioll for second defendant.
'1'he decree of the Northern Circui t High Court dated September 10, 1947
i 8 therefore set aside, and it i 8 ordered that the case should go to the Shendi
District Court to decide whether the sale to plaiiltiff' or de1endant was the
first ill time.
The cost, to abide the event.
Application allowed

