Land law - Pre-emption - Timeliness - Holder of pre-emptive rights need
only bring suit after notifioation of aotua1 "sale," not a mere
intention to sell.

Land. law - Pre-empt ion - When right arises - Whether negot iat iail to sell
constitute 'sale' - Right not renounced when it does not exist.

Hords and phrases - "Sale".

A person can only be entitled to a right of pre-emption under
the Pre-emption Ordinance 1928, \~here there exists an agreement for
sale of definite property to a named purchaser at a fixed prioe.
Before such a right arises, it oannot be renounoed, nor is the holder
of such rights bound to assert his claim before knowledge of such
completed sale.

Pre-emption Ordinance 1928, SSe 5 and 16(a).

Appeal.

The relevant fact El appear in the concurring opinion of J. G. r.'!avrogordat Cit,

AI C.J. who is absent on leave. Having pursued the proceedings and having
heard the representatives of the parties on the appeal I am satisfied
that the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff eWI' renounoed his

right of pre-emption. Having made inquirl.el!l I am satisfied that the de ley

in raising the pre-emjtion suit was not oocasioned by failure to aot on
the part of the plaintiff.

* Court: O'Meara, ~C.J., S.R. Simpson, Esq. and J.G. Mavrogordato, Esq.

I would therefore reverse the decree on revision given by the learned
Judge of High Court Northern Province and declare that the claim of the
plaintiff to exercise the right of pre-emption as against the defendants
in respect of the land described has been established.

It is hereby ordered that upon payment into courl of LS.54 in respect
of the pUrchase price that the said land do vest in the plaintiff free
from all claims or interests herein of the defendants but subject to

the registration of this decree in the Shendi Land Registry.

It is ordered that the defendants will pay the costs of the action.

S.R. Simpson, Esq.: I conqur.

J. G. Mavt;ogordato, Esq.: I agree. Under the Pre-emption Ordinance
1928 the right of pre-emption only arises "upon sale" of the property

in question (section 5). A person can aocordingly in my judgment only
be"entitled to a right of pre-emption" within the meaning of section 16
where there exists an agreement .for sale of definite property to a named
purchaser at a fixed price. A.mere statement of intention to sell,

without mention of price or purchaser, does not give rise to any right

of pre-emptionj and where there exists no right, that right cannot of
course be renounced within the meaning of section 16(a).

In this case it is clear, and indeed admitted by the defendants

that they never notified the plaintiff of the existence of a "sale" in
the above sense. Even therefore if the plaintiff were informed by the
defendants of an intended or contemplated sale of this property (and as
to this I am by no means convinced on the evidence), I hold that the
plaintiff was thereby neither bound nor indeed able to claim or renounce
a right of pre-emption. He was not therefore debarred, when an actual
sale was negotiated and completed, from claiming his right of pre-emption.

I also agree that the plaintiff should not be penalised for the
delay in raising the pre-emption suit.

Appeal allowed.