IHSAN KHALIL GIRGIS v. BARSAMIAN MOTORS, LTD
Case No.:
AC-REV-101- I 963
Court:
Court of Appeal
Issue No.:
1962
Principles
· Civil Procedure _Execution_ imprisonment for debt—Civil Justice Ordinance 1929. S 19 may be imprisoned for debt
Women may be imprisoned under Civil Justice Ordinance 1919, 5. 198. for failure to pay a judgment debt.
Judgment
(COURT OF APPEAL) *
IHSAN KHALIL GIRGIS v. BARSAMIAN MOTORS, LTD
AC-REV-101- I 963
Advocate: Mohamed Ahmed Orabi …… for the judgment-debtor-applicant
Dafalla El Radi Siddig D.J. February 2, 1963, EX- (High Court, Khartoum): —The decree-holder is applying to set Civil Justice Ordinance, S. 198, in motion against the judgment-debtor for failure to comply with an agreement to pay £S.5 monthly, and for falling in arrears agreed to have amounted to £S.45. It is pleaded for the judgment-debtor that she has justification to explain her falling in arrears. I would rather tackle the points raised.
The judgment-debtor stated that she fell ill and was operated on some time in 1961. She spent £S.13.500m/ms. for the operation, and she paid for medicine as well, It is to be noticed here that she did not say how much. I believe this is the only change that financially affected the judgment-debtor’s life. All the other things about the expenditure at her home did not change. There is no evidence to show that anything occurred besides her falling ill that could change the situation to justify the judgment-debtor in failing to pay as agreed. She fell in arrears for nine months. It is also important here to state that the judgment-debtor admitted that she pays the cnurch as alms £S.3.500m/ms. Monthly to maintain good relations with God. I appreciate her incentive, but I feel there is nothing profane about requiring that one pays his debts first, and then meets his other social and religious obligations, if his means are so limited that he can only meet one obligation at a time. The judgment- debtor ought, I believe, to give preference to the rights of people; other wise, she has to bear the consequence. Indeed there is no honey without the stings of bees: she has to pay the price.
The learned counsel for judgment-debtor referred to an Indian authority to the effect that women could not be jailed for civil debts. I do not know why the Indian authority came into being, but I must with respect retract from finding guidance therein.
When women become emancipated they must look to equality before the law, particularly in regard to responsibility for debts and the con sequences of non-payment. Because a large number of our women-folk are not thoroughly emancipated, this rule may not be universal; each case should be tackled on its own merits. But in the case before us the judgment-debtor is a working woman and made a promise to pay what she thought she was able to do. She was the best judge of her own financial situation when she so promised. She has failed here to show good cause why she fell into arrears. In this event, I cannot see why she should not be jailed for failure to pay her debts in circumstances which no doubt justify the sending of any male to jail. I mean the gender factor alone should not be our guide in the issue before us. Otherwise there will be an open door for women to contract debts recklessly and refrain from payment.
By analogy with our criminal law, the gender factor has neither protected women from jail nor hanging.
Thus it is clear that the judgment-debtor either refused or neglected to pay her debt. Therefore I am using my discretion against judgment under Civil Justice Ordinance, s. 198, and unless she pays the arrears, or agrees with the decree-holder for payment in. 10 days’ time she shall go to prison for 14 days.
Abdel Mageed Imam J. March I 2, 1963, HC-REV-411 -I958: —The circumstances proved against applicant, the judgment-debtor warrant her being sent to jail under Civil Justice Ordinance, s. 198. The fact that she is a woman can be of no avail. The application is summarily dismissed.
M. A. Abu Rannat C.J. April 24, I963: —l see no reason to differ with the reasons given by the District Judge and upheld by the Judge of the High Court and I therefore dismiss this application summarily.
• Court: M. A. Abu Rannat C.J.

